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LOOKING SIDEWAYS, LOOKINGBACKWARDS, LOOKING
FORWARDS: JUDICIAL REVIEW VS. DEMOCRACY IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Ran Hirschl*
I. THE CONTEXT OF TAING THE CONSTITUTIONAWAY FROM
THE COURTS
In a recent article, Daniel Lazare argues that:
For the [past] two centuries, the Constitution [has been] as central to
American political culture as the New Testament was to medieval
Europe. Just as Milton believed that "all wisdom is enfolded" within
the pages of the Bible, all good Americans, from the National Rifle
Association to the ACLU, have believed no less of this singular
document.'
Indeed, remarkably profound effects, symbolic and practical, are
often attributed to the American Bill of Rights and judicial review
by scholars, legal practitioners, and political activists. Mark
Tushnet's splendid book, Taking the Constitution Away from the
Courts,2 is perhaps the best of a recent spate of critical studies that
have sought to revisit the optimistic albeit untested and abstract
court-centric consensus of the post-Brown generation in American
constitutional law scholarship.
Most of these critical works are preoccupied with four fundamen-
tal issues. First, many political theorists criticize the notion of
rights, emphasizing the impoverished, individualistic, and solipsistic
view of society that rights-discourse tends to reflect and promote, as
opposed to a more desirable communitarian ideal of human
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto. B.A., 1989, Tel-Aviv
University;, LL.B., 1992, Tel-Aviv University;, M.A., 1993, Tel-Aviv University;, M.Phil., 1996,
Yale University; Ph.D., 1999, Yale University. Iwould like to thank Dan Friedman, Chandra
Hodgson, and Dina Bogecho for their assistance in preparing this essay for publication.
Special thanks to Ayelet Shachar for her helpful comments.
1. Daniel Lazare, America the Undemocratic, 232 NEW LEFT REv. 3, 9-10 (1998).
2. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
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fulfillment.3 The current "culture of rights," these scholars argue,
leads people to see in others the limitation of their freedom and
promotes a morally distorted conception of human relations whereby
"my fulfillment, my freedom and my self-realization depend upon
my self-assertive capacity to place limits on yours."4 Mary Ann
Glendon argues that:
A rapidly expanding catalogue of rights extending to trees, animals,
smokers, non-smokers, consumers and so on, not only multiplies the
occasions for collisions, but it risks trivializing core democratic values.
A tendency to frame nearly every social controversy in terms of a clash
of rights (a woman's right to her own body versus a fetus' right to life)
impedes compromise, mutual understanding and the discovery of
common ground.'
Second, other critical studies of American constitutional law and
politics focus on the history of judicial interpretation of constitu-
tional rights by the U.S. Supreme Court. According to this body of
literature, the U.S. Supreme Court is inclined to rule in accordance
with national meta-narratives, prevailing ideological and cultural
propensities, and the interests of ruling elites.6 While canonical
constitutional law scholarship sees the Bill of Rights and judicial
review as holding American political institutions to a paramount
commitment to protect fundamental freedoms of minorities against
the tyranny of the majority, critical scholars of American constitu-
tional law suggest that in times of crisis and panic, and despite the
dejure protection of minorities by bills of rights, judges are likely to
3. See RONALD BEINER, WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH LIBERALISM? 80-97 (1992). See
generally MARYANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DIScOuRSE
171-83 (1991); NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM, BURKE AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN
151-209 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1987) [hereinafter NONSENSE UPON STILTS]; Chantal Mouffe,
Hegemony and New Political Subjects: Toward a New Concept ofDemocracy, in MARXISMAND
THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988); Mark
Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1363 (1984).
4. NONSENSE UPON STILTS, supra note 3, at 196.
5. GLENDON, supra note 3, at xi.
6. The literature on this subject is voluminous. For examples representing different
theoretical approaches, see generally ROGERS M. SMITH, CriTc IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS
OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997); MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRMTIcAL
ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy:
The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957); Jack Knight & Lee
Epstein, On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, 30 L. & SOC'Y REv. 87 (1996); Harold H.
Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs, 97 YALE L.J. 1255 (1988);
and William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as Countermajoritarian
Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87AM. POL. SC. REv.
87 (1993).
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be swept along by the same tide of emotion and prejudice that moves
legislators, the media, and the public. As Tushnet's closely reasoned
and well-researched work suggests, "[1] ooking at judicial review over
the course of U.S. history, we see the courts regularly being more or
less in line with what the dominant national coalition wants."7
Indeed, the widely celebrated Bill of Rights did not prevent the U.S.
Supreme Court from reconfirming the legal status of slavery and
servitude before the Civil War,' or from blocking anti-laissez faire
initiatives aimed at protecting workers in the first decades of the
twentieth century.9 The Supreme Court did not protect Japanese
Americans who were detained in concentration camps during World
War II,1" nor did the First Amendment prevent the Supreme Court
from upholding the persecution of Communist Party members
during the McCarthy period through legislation stating that
"[w]hoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or
7. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 153.
8. See Dred Scottv. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,469 (1856). In this famous case, the
Court held that "[the Negro is] bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of
merchandise and traffic," id. at 407, and therefore, "the power of Congress over the person
or [slave] property of a citizen can never be a mere discretionary power." Id. at 449.
9. See Lochnerv. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905). It is important to note in this regard
that the legal interpretation of bills of rights under market liberalism shows a marked
tendency to reflect that ideological atmosphere by protecting liberty and property rather than
supporting state-underwritten regulatory employment laws. The best known example of this
occurred during the era of"Lochnerism" in the United States, when a profoundly conservative
Supreme Court used the Constitution's "Contract Clause," the 'Takings Clause," and the
Fourteenth Amendment to block socially progressive legislation for more than 30 years.
DuringtheLochner era, roughlythe period from 1885 to 1930, the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down some 150 pieces of legislation concerning labor relations, labor conditions, and working
hours. In the famous Lochner ruling, the Court invalidated a state law that limited the
working hours of bakers, claiming that the safety of bakers provided "no reasonable ground
for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of free contract." Id. at 57. During the
Lochner era, the Court declared unconstitutional laws banning "yellow dog" contracts. See
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 179 (1908) (concluding that "[tihere is no connection
between interstate commerce and membership in a labor organization as to authorize
Congress to make it a crime against the United States for an agent of an interstate carrier
to discharge an employee because of such membership on his part"); Coppage v. Kansas, 236
U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (holding that a contract that forbids membership in a labor organization is
"repugnant" to the Fourteenth Amendment). The Court also declared unconstitutional laws
requiring minimum wages for women and children, see Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S.
525, 558 (1923) (concluding that fixing wages for women and children in the District of
Columbia "exacts from the employer an arbitrary payment for a purpose and upon a basis
having no causal connection with his business, or the contract or the work the employee
engages to do"), andlaws restricting childlabor. See Hammerv. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251,276
(1918) (concluding that Congress cannot regulate "local matters" by prohibiting "the
movement of commodities in interstate commerce"). A host of other laws similar in nature
were also declared unconstitutional.
10. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 244 (1944) (concluding that
Congress's actions were justified).
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teaches the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrow-
ing or destroying any government in the United States [shall be
fined or imprisoned]."'" After convictions based on little more than
proof of adherence to Communist Party doctrine-presented by the
Court as "substantive evil" and as a "clear and present
danger'-leading party officials were imprisoned for three to five
years and defense attorneys were cited for contempt, imprisoned,
and later disbarred. From Dred Scott v. Sandford2 to Bowers v.
Hardwick,3 from Lochner v. New York14 to Buckley v. Valeo,'5 from
Gregg v. Georgia 16 to McCleskey v. Kemp 7 to United States v.
Lopez, 8 and with the often-cited exception of the Warren Court, the
Supreme Court maintained its historic position on the Right of the
American political spectrum. 9
11. The Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1940); see American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382,396 (1950) (holding that section 9(h) of the Management Labor Relation
Act, which required an affidavit stating that one is not a communist and not a member of an
organization that advances the overthrow of the U.S. government, is constitutional because
of Congress's interest in protecting the flow of commerce); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 514 (1951) (holding that the Smith Act may be applied where there is a "clear and
present danger" of substantive evil). In Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), the Court,
in a six to one decision, overturned the convictions of several members of the Communist
Party for conspiracy to violate the Smith Act. See id. at 315 (holding that even where the
philosophy being taught is rejected by a majority of the American public, the proponents have
the right to assemble peaceably to promote their views). For rulings on First Amendment
issues during the Lochner era, see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); and Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
12. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
13. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
14. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
15. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
16. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
17. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
18. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
19. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the U.S. Supreme Court refused to
declare the State of Georgia's sodomy laws unconstitutional, making it a criminal offense,
punishable by imprisonment, for two consenting men to engage in homosexual activity in
private. In a five to four decision that has been widely criticized, the Chief Justice, concurring
injudgment, drew inspiration for sustaining the law from the condemnation ofhomosexuality
that he said was firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards. See id. at 196
(Burger, C.J., concurring). In so doing, he referred to homosexual lovemaking as "the
infamous crime against nature" and as an offense of "deeper malignity" than rape, a heinous
act, "the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature" and "a crime not fit to be
named."Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring). In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Court
struck down campaign finance reform that put spending limits on political candidates and so-
called third parties, on the ground that such limits violate the First Amendment's guarantee
of free speech. See id. at 54. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the Court put its stamp
of approval on the death penalty, after calling it into question a few years previous in Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207. In United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995), the Court held that Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority in
forbidding students from carrying handguns in local public schools. See id. at 551. In
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Recent studies of judicial decision-making also suggest that the
U.S. Supreme Court Justices may primarily be framers of legal
policy, but they are also strategic actors who may realize when the
changing preferences of other influential political actors, as well as
changes in the institutional context, might allow them to strengthen
their own institutional position by expanding their involvement in
crucial policymaking arenas.20 According to these studies, landmark
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, have not merely
been apoliticaljurisprudence, or a reflection of its Justices' ideologi-
cal preferences and values as "attitudinal" models of judicial
behavior suggest,21 but also a reflection of their strategic behavior
as rational actors who seek to enhance the Court's institutional
position vis-a-vis other major national decision-making bodies such
as Congress and the President.
The third major branch of critical studies of constitutional law
questions the ability of the U.S. Supreme Court to introduce
practical (as opposed to merely symbolic) changes into American
society through landmark judgments on constitutional rights.22 In
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), the Court upheld Georgia's death penalty even in
the face of an undisputed statistical study showing racial bias in its application. See id. at
297.
20. See, e.g., SUPREMiE COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES
(Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE
CHOICES JUSTICES MARE (1998); Lee Epstein & Thomas Walker, The Role of the Supreme
Court inAmerican Society. Playing the Reconstructing Game, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 315
(1995); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991); John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Congressional
Influences on Bureacracy, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (spec. ed. 1990).
21. See, e.g., JEFFEREY SEGAL & HAROLD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
22. For studies analyzing the symbolic impact of the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark
constitutional rights judgments, see, for example, MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AIERICAN LAW (1990); PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); and Kimberlie Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1331 (1988).
For studies examining the practicalimpact ofjudicial review and constitutional rights
litigation, see, for example, JOEL HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A
THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978); DONALD HOROWiTZ, THE COURTS AND
SOCiALPOLiCY (1977); LEVERAGINGTHE LAW: USINGTHE COURTS TO ACHmVE SOCIAL CHANGE
(David A. Schultz ed., 1998) [hereinafter LEVERAGING THE LAW]; MICHAEL MCCANN, RIGHTS
ATWORI PAYEQUITYREFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994); GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); STUART
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS (1974); N. Dometrius & L. Sigelman, Modeling the
Impact of Supreme Court Decisions: Nygantv. Board, 50 J. POL. 131 (1988); RobertF. Drinan,
Are the Expectationsforthe ReligiousFreedomRestorationActBeingRealized?, 39J. CHURCH
& ST. 53 (1997); Malcolm M. Feeley, Hollow Hopes, Flypaper and Metaphors, 17 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 745 (1993); Mark Galanter, The Radiating Effects of Courts, in EMPIRICALTHEORIES
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his polemic against the "dynamic court" approach, Gerald
Rosenberg, for example, demonstrates the gap between the alleged
promises and the actual achievements of liberal reform litigation.23
According to Rosenberg's "constrained court" thesis, the U.S.
Supreme Court's role in producing social reforms (at least in the
domains of racial desegregation and abortion) has been far less
significant than conventional wisdom would have it. In fact, hostile
opposition forces were able to completely neutralize the Court's
seemingly ground-breaking ruling in Brown v. Board ofEducation'
in the first decade after the decision; moreover, the limited progress
made after the ruling was due to a shift in political forces that had
everything to do with the changing economic role of African-
Americans and their own extra-legal activism and little or nothing
to do with the Supreme Court. In this context, Rosenberg argues
that
[t]o ask [courts] to produce significant social reform is to forget their history
and ignore their constraints. It is to cloud our vision with a naive and
romantic belief in the triumph of rights over politics. And while romance and
even naivete have their charms, they are not best exhibited in court rooms.'
Other empirical studies of the effects of U.S. rights-litigation also
make a compelling argument against the commonly held belief that
supreme courts can bring about effective policy change, and show
that while rights-litigation victories may have a symbolic signifi-
cance, they do not necessarily have any immediate impact on
people's lives.26
Still other scholars, most notably Mark Tushnet, emphasize the
counter-majoritarian tendency embedded in rigid constitutional
ABoUT CouRTs 117 (Keith Doyum & Lynn Mather eds., 1983); Mark Galanter, Why the 'Haves'
Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Socky REv. 97 (1974);
Charles Lawrence, 'One More River to Cross'-Recognizing the Real Injury in Brown: A
Prerequisite to Shaping New Remedies, in SHADES OFBROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 49 (Derick Bell ed., 1980); Michael W. McCann, Reform Litigation on Trial,
17 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 716 (1993); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality
of Political Power, 54 REV. OF POL. 369 (1992); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Real World of
Constitutional Rights: The Supreme Court and the Implementation ofAbortion Decisions, in
CONTEMPLATING COURTS, supra note 20, at 390; Peter H. Schuck, Public Law Litigation and
Social Reform, 102 YALE L.J. 1763 (1993); Reva B. Siegel, The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996); and Donald Songer, Alternative
Approaches to the Study of Judicial Impact: Miranda in Five State Courts, 16 AM. POL. Q. 425
(1988).
23. See ROSENBERG, supra note 22.
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
25. ROSENBERG, supra note 22, at 343.
26. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 22.
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arrangements in general, and in judicial review (the courts' power
to invalidate federal and state statutes and administrative acts on
the grounds that the challenged statute or act is in conflict with the
Constitution) in particular. They question the legitimacy of transfer-
ring important policy-making prerogatives from elected and
accountable politicians, parliaments, and other majoritarian
decision-making bodies to the judiciary.27 The "democracy vs.
juristocracy" debate has produced voluminous literature over the
years, which can be characterized in terms of a simple paradox. On
the one hand, the separation of power and its implementation by
judicial review are an indispensable element of liberal democracy
because it ensures that the legislature and the executive are not
acting ultra vires. On the other hand, if judicial review evolves so
that political power in its judicial guise is limited only by a constitu-
tion whose meaning courts alone define, then the judicial power,
which had previously acted as a restraint, is no longer constrained
by constitutional limits. The apparent paradox here is that in the
name ofliberal constitutionalism, activejudicial review may destroy
the most important political right that citizens in liberal democra-
cies possess: the right to participation and self-government.
All of these works are skeptical about the place of constitu-
tionalism and judicial review in the pursuit of social justice. They
argue for a smaller role for courts and a more robust one for
democratic politics in defining and interpreting principles of
equality, freedom, and democracy.28 Some of these works also try to
develop strategies for overcoming the apparent tension between
rigid constitutionalism and judicial review on the one hand, and
27. The literature on the question of legitimacy of judicial review and the "counter-
majoritarian" essence of judicial review is voluminous. For critiques of judicial review on
democratic grounds, see TUSHNET, supra note 2; James Allan, Bills of Rights and Judicial
Power-A Liberal's Quandary, 16 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 337 (1996); Jeremy Waldron, A
Rights-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18 (1993); and
Jeremy Waldron, Judicial Review and the Conditions for Democracy, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 335
(1998).
For attempts to justify constitutional rights-based judicial review, see 1 BRUCE
ACKEIAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1992); ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURTATTHE BAR OFPOLITICS (1962); RONALD DWORKIN,
A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); RONALD DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIE (1986); RONALD DwORK[N,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOuSLY(1978); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: ATHEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEw (1980); and JOHN RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
28. See, e.g., ROBERTA. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992); AMY GUTMANN &
DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC
JUSTICE (1999); JEREMYWALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999); JEREMY WALDRON,
LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
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fundamental democratic values of political participation and
representation on the other.29
In his insightful discussion in Taking the Constitution Away from
the Courts, for example, Mark Tushnet argues against a view that
sees constitutional law as the principal domain of courts (as opposed
to the domain of politics), and calls for a "populist constitu-
tionalism," one that "is committed to the principle of universal
human rights justifiable by reason in the service of self-govern-
ment," ° and "creates space for a politics oriented by the Declara-
tion's principles by taking constitutional law away from the
courts."3' He further supports this view arguing that "[sluch a
politics actually can have real bite, but no one can guarantee that it
will produce specific results."32 In short, Tushnet argues, it is
ultimately "We the People" who must interpret the Constitution.3
Indeed, the evidence provided by Tushnet and other prominent
constitutionalists and social scientists suggests that simple and
sweeping claims about the positive effects of the constitutional
catalogues of rights and judicial review ought to be viewed skepti-
cally. There is much to question regarding assertions that the
constitutionalization of rights and the establishment of judicial
review have been or are likely to be agencies of effective reform and
offer substantive protection for the disadvantaged. In practice, and
despite an abundance of rhetoric to the contrary, proponents of
judicial review cannot point to any deep and enduring evidence that
the constitutional entrenchment of rights or the existence of active
judicial review practices have ever been responsible for long-lasting
and effective social change. The United States, the source of many
claims on behalf of constitutional rights and active judicial review,
and the first modem democracy erected on the premise that its
reason for being was to secure the rights of its citizens through
constitutionally entrenched rights, is perhaps the clearest contempo-
rary example of a long and established tradition of constitutional
protection of rights and active judicial review that does not disturb
29. See, e.g., DAVID DYZENHAUS, JUDGING THE JUDGES, JUDGING OURSELVES (1998);
CHARLES Epp, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998); MARTHAMINOW, BETWEENVENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS
(1999); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT (1999).
30. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 181.
31. Id. at 187.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 194.
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the basic political and economic organization of American society. It
has the most unequal distribution of income among Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") countries, with
vast social disparity and de facto racial segregation, and is con-
trolled to a large extent by the sheer power of corporate capital.
Moreover, there can be little doubt that the indiscriminate use of the
language of constitutional rights has led at times to an almost
narcissist individualism and irresponsibility in American social and
political life, dividing American society into self-serving, insular
human enclaves. I would speculate (although this can never be
proven) that, in general, the de facto status of rights in Britain (one
of the last bastions of the Westminster system), for example, has not
been significantly lower during the past two centuries than in the
United States, which has had more than two centuries of experience
with a widely celebrated Bill of Rights and almost two centuries of
active judicial review.
II. LOOKING SIDEWAYS: THE "NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM"
While the four major categories of critical studies outlined above
succeed in undermining the complacent view that judicial review is
unequivocally positive, they all draw exclusively on the experience
of the American "rights revolution" and history ofjudicial review. It
is remarkable how rarely books and articles on American constitu-
tional law and politics, for example, refer to constitutions and bills
of rights in other countries. As George P. Fletcher notes, "[a]
striking feature of the American jurisprudential debate is its
provinciality. The arguments [are put] forward as though [the
American legal system were] the only legal system in the world."34
Indeed, many American scholars of constitutional law and politics
treat the term "Constitution" as though it were a proper name,
rather than a concept whose nature, origins, and consequences could
best be understood by examining and comparing a variety of
instances of constitutionalism. American parochialism with regard
to other countries' constitutional arrangements and practices is
especially remarkable given the fact that more than eighty countries
34. George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J. COMP. L.
683, 691 (1998). For a recent critique of American parochialism in this regard, see, for
example, HERBERT JACOB ET AL., COURTS, LAW AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
(1996); Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, in 3 YALE LAW SCHOOL
OCCASIONAL PAPERS (1997); and Martin Shapiro, Public Law and Judicial Politics, in
POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 365 (Ada Finifter ed., 1992).
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and several supranational entities have engaged in fundamental
constitutional reform over the past three decades alone. These
countries range from the Eastern Bloc to Canada, from new
democracies in Latin America to South Africa, and from the EU to
Israel. Significantly, nearly every recently adopted constitution or
constitutional revision contains a bill of rights and establishes some
form of active judicial review." In most countries in which a
constitutional bill of rights has been recently enacted, as well as in
many established democracies that adopted a variety of administra-
tive and judicial review procedures in the postwar decade (for
example, Germany, India, Italy, and France), national high courts
have become increasingly important, if not crucial, public policy-
makers. In all of these countries there has been an increasing
intrusion of the judiciary into the prerogatives of legislatures and
executives, and a corresponding acceleration of the process whereby
political agendas have been judicialized, thus bringing about a
growing reliance on adjudicative means for clarifying and settling
crucial public-policy issues and normative debates. By and large,
American scholarship on constitutional politics tends to ignore these
worldwide phenomena. And whereas several single polity studies
concerning the constitutional politics of other established democra-
cies (for example, Britain, Germany, and France) and supranational
entities (such as the European Union) have appeared over the past
few years, genuinely comparative studies of judicial politics and
35. The full list ofcountries that have undergone fundamental constitutional reform since
the early 1970s is too long to cite. For example, Canada adopted a Charter of Rights in 1982.
See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
New Zealand did likewise in 1990, see New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990, as did Hong Kong
in 1991, see Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, No. 59 (1991). Almost all the new
democracies in eastern Europe (for example, Hungary (1990), Bulgaria (1991), Romania
(1992), Poland (1992), the Czech Republic (1993), Russia (1993), and Slovakia (1993)) adopted
bills of basic rights as part of their new constitutions. See generally CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 2000). Israel adopted new Basic Laws
protecting certain fundamental rights in 1992. See Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 1992,
S.H. 1387, Basic Law Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 1391. Denmark incorporated
the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights into its domestic law in 1993,
followed by Sweden in 1995. South Africa adopted a Bill of Rights as part of its new
constitution in 1994, and established a new Constitutional Court in 1995. See S. AFR. CONST.
§ 167. Even Britain, one of the last bastions of the Westminster system, has recently enacted
the Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42 (Eng.) (effective October 2, 2000), which effectively
incorporates the provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 1 (1950) into British
constitutional law; this enactment marks the first rights legislation to be introduced in the
U.K in 300 years.
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constitutional rights jurisprudence of other countries are still
extremely rare, ill-informed, and lack a coherent methodology.
The dearth of comparative research into the origins and conse-
quences of constitutionalization has an important methodological
implication. Because few studies by American constitutionalists
examine the origins and consequences of constitutionalization and
judicial review in countries other than the United States, critics of
judicial review often fail to address a common counterargument
made by proponents of judicial review, namely that we know what
the U.S. Supreme Court has done in the name ofjudicial review, but
we do not know what legislatures would have done if the Supreme
Court had eschewed or disclaimed the power of judicial review.36
Because the American constitutional legacy of active judicial
review is nearing its bicentennial anniversary, diachronic, quasi-
experimental, prelegislation/post-legislation empirical research into
the impact of the constitutionalization of rights and the establish-
ment of judicial review is indeed difficult, if not impossible, to
conduct. This is in direct contradistinction to countries with a
relatively short experience of judicial review where such a
diachronic, prelegislation/post-legislation study would be possible to
conduct while holding other variables to a manageable level. While
the extremely rich and diverse constitutional jurisprudence of the
U.S. Supreme Court over the past two centuries provides us with an
abundance of data pertaining to judicial interpretation and behav-
ior, the American constitutional legacy is perhaps the least appro-
priate for assessing the function of judicial review in the pursuit of
social justice as there is no alternative domestic model against
which to measure the achievements of the Constitution. In contrast,
the fact that numerous countries have undergone a transition to
"juristocracy" over the past few decades, primarily through the
constitutionalization of rights and the establishment of judicial
review, provides a fertile terrain for investigating the political
origins of the increasingly popular transfer of policymaking from
legislatures and executives to the judiciary, as well as for measuring
empirically the effects of using the courts as fora for vindicating
fundamental social values. Moreover, the recent global wave of
36. Seegenerally LEVERAGINGTHELAW, supra note 22; MCCANN, supra note 22; Eskridge,
supra note 20; Feeley, supra note 22; Thomas Marshall, Policymaking and the Modern Court:
When Do Supreme Court Rulings Prevail?, 42 W. POL. Q. 493 (1989); David A. Schultz &
Stephen E. Gottlieb, Legal Functionalism and Social Change:A Reassessment of Rosenberg's
The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring about Social Change?, 12 J.L. & POL. 63 (1996).
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constitutionalization should allow scholars, legislators, and jurists
to compare the experiences of the "New Constitutionalism," its
pitfalls and successes, in an attempt to develop innovative judicial
strategies for maximizing the democratic potential of judicial
review.
To provide a rough taxonomy, four broad scenarios of
constitutionalization have been most commonly employed in the
past three decades: (1) the "incorporation" scenario, in which
constitutionalization was part of an incorporation of international
and transnational legal standards and supranational regimes into
domestic law;37 (2) the "dual transition" scenario, in which
constitutionalization was part of a dual transition to a Western-
model democracy and a market economy; 8 (3) the "single transition"
scenario, in which the constitutionalization of rights and the
expansion ofjudicial power have been the byproducts of a transition
to democracy; 39  and (4) the "no apparent transition"
constitutionalization scenario, in which constitutional reforms have
neither been accompanied by, nor have resulted from, fundamental
changes in political or economic regimes.4 ° Each of these types of
constitutional reform pose their own puzzles for scholars of public
law and judicial politics. It is the "no apparent transition" scenario
of constitutional revolutions, however, that I find the most attrac-
tive from a methodological standpoint.
The recent constitutional revolutions in Canada, which in 1982
adopted a new Constitution Act that includes the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, 4' New Zealand, which enacted the New Zealand Bill
of Rights Act in 1990,42 and Israel, which adopted two new Basic
37. An example of this is the recent enactment in the U.K. of the Human Rights Act of
1998, ch. 42 (Eng.).
38. An example of this scenario is the transition that has occurred in Eastern Bloc
countries.
39. An example of this scenario is the transition in South Africa.
40. Examples of this scenario include Canada in 1982, New Zealand in 1990, and Israel
in 1992.
41. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. 1 (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms). The full text of the 1982 Constitution Act and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
is reproduced in many books dealing with Canadian constitutional law and politics. See, e.g.,
PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 1109-41 (1999).
42. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990. The full text of the Act is reproduced in many
books dealing with New Zealand's constitutional law and politics. See, e.g., RIGHTS AND
FREEDOMS: THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990 AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1993
(Grant Huscroft & Paul Rishworth eds., 1995).
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Laws protecting various civil liberties in 1992,"8 provide a nearly
ideal testing ground for identifying the political origins and
consequences of the constitutionalization of rights and the fortifica-
tion of judicial review. First, all three countries have undergone
major constitutional reform over the past few years, which has
included, among other things, a constitutionalization of rights and
substantive judicial empowerment through the fortification of
judicial review. Unlike many former Eastern Bloc countries, for
example, the dramatic constitutional changes in all three countries
have neither been accompanied by, nor resulted from, major changes
in their political and economic regimes. It is hence possible to
disentangle the political origins of constitutionalization from other
possible explanations for constitutional change, and to distinguish
the impact of judicial empowerment through constitutionalization
on changes in judicial interpretation and the judicialization of
politics. Second, the constitutional revolutions in Canada, Israel,
and New Zealand have taken place in societies deeply divided along
political, economic, and ethnic lines. A study of these three constitu-
tional revolutions therefore allows us to assess how far the move
toward judicial empowerment through constitutionalization had its
political origins in pre-existent socio-political struggles within each
given polity. Third, the recent constitutionalization of rights and
fortification of judicial review in these three countries marks a
departure from the Westminster model of parliamentary supremacy
and the established British legal tradition of judicial restraint in
these countries-thus providing the Canadian Supreme Court, the
New Zealand Court of Appeal, and the Israeli Supreme Court with
the necessary institutional framework for becoming more vigilant in
protecting basic rights and liberties. Indeed, these three national
courts have reacted with great enthusiasm to the
constitutionalization of rights and the fortification ofjudicial review
in their respective domains by adjudicating many landmark
constitutional rights cases over the past decade. Fourth, all three
polities possess a strong British common-law legal tradition. This
common inheritance eliminates variations in legal tradition as
possible explanations for differences in legal activity, judicial
43. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 1992, S.H. 114, was officially enacted on March
3, 1992, and amended two years later, on March 9, 1994. See Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation, 1994, S.H. 90. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 155, was
officially enacted by the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) on March 17, 1992, two weeks after
the enactment of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation Act. The official English version of
the new Basic Laws is available at the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site, see Israel
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (visited Mar. 28, 2000) <http://www.mfa.gov.iI/mfa/go.asp/>.
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interpretation, and the judicialization of politics among the three
countries. At the same time, these three countries embody different
models of judicial review as well as distinct variances in the status
of constitutional rights. The significance of formal institutional
factors can thus be assessed while also accounting for variations in
legal and political outcomes of constitutionalization as experienced
by all three polities. For these reasons, the constitutional revolu-
tions of Canada, Israel, and New Zealand (among others) provide a
nearly ideal testing ground for assessing the impact of
constitutionalization upon prevalent patterns ofjudicial interpreta-
tion, the de facto status of historically disenfranchised groups and
individuals, and the judicialization of politics."
But the transformation ofjudicial institutions into major political
actors is not limited to the national level. At the supranational level,
the European Court of Justice interprets the treaties upon which
the European Union ("EU") is founded, and has been awarded an
increasingly important status by legislators, executives, and
judiciaries in EU member-states dealing with interstate legal and
economic disputes. The European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg, the judicial arm of the forty-one-member Council of
Europe, has, in effect, become the final court of appeal on human-
rights issues for most of Europe. The judgments of both European
courts carry great weight and have forced many countries to
incorporate transnational legal standards into their domestic legal
system. Present calls for the adoption of a global constitution and for
the establishment of an international tribunal for war crimes and
human rights violations also suggest that law and courts in general,
and the constitutionalization of rights in particular, are becoming
key factors in international politics as well.
The delegation of policymaking authority to semiautonomous,
professional bodies has also expanded in other, nonjudicial realms
over the past three decades. In many countries, for example, there
has been a general move toward granting greater independence to
44. I embark on a comprehensive comparative inquiry into the political origins and
consequences of judicial empowerment through the constitutionalization of rights and the
establishment of judicial review in a book I am currently completing. For two articles
presenting parts of this work, see Ran Hirschl, Negative Rights vs. Positive Entitlements: A
Comparative Study of Judicial Interpretations of Rights in an Emerging Neo-Liberal
Economic Order, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. (forthcomingAug. 2000); Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins
of Judicial Empowerment through Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four Constitutional
Revolutions, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 91 (2000) [hereinafter Hirschl, The Political Origins of
Judicial Empowerment through Constitutionalization].
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central banks.45 Countries such as Belgium, Britain, France, Spain,
Brazil, and Argentina (to mention only a few examples) have all
increased the autonomy of their respective central banks.46 In these
(and many other) countries, democratically elected governments can
no longer exclusively control the process of monetary policymaking.
Supranational policymaking bodies, mostly EU-affiliated, have
increasingly dealt with many aspects of everyday life in the
European continent over the past three decades. The hallmarks of
this process have been: (1) the establishment of the new European
Central Bank; (2) the recent launch of the single European currency;
(3) the emergence of a complex nexus of -supranational legal
provisions regulating production, import and export of goods,
taxation, and customs throughout the continent; (4) the reconstruc-
tion and expansion of NATO; and (5) the emergence oftransnational
bodies dealing with problems of immigration, natural resources,
labor relations, food and drug licensing and regulation, environmen-
tal preservation, and so forth. A similar process has also taken
place, albeit at a slower pace, in other continents (for example, the
emergence of transnational trade treaties such as NAFTA in North
America,4v MERCOSUR in South America,48 and ASEAN in Asia49),
as well as at the intercontinental level (for example, the rise of
supranational bodies such as the IMF and the WTO that monitor
substantive aspects of global trade and international monetary
policies). In short, a large-scale transfer of crucial policymaking
prerogatives from majoritarian decision-making arenas to domestic
and transnational semiautonomous and relatively insulated
policymaking bodies such as national high courts, central banks,
supranational trade organizations, monetary funds, and judicial
tribunals has established itself over the past few decades.
These and other phenomena similar in nature provide
"Americanists" and "comparativists" alike with fertile terrain for
studies concerning various normative and empirical aspects of the
question Tushnet is concerned with, namely the "democratic deficit"
inherent in the transfer of policymaking power from elected and
45. See, e.g., ROBERTELGIE&HELENTHOMPSoN, THEPOLITIcSOFCENTRALBANKS (1998);
Robert Elgie, Democratic Accountability and Central Bank Independence: Historical and
Contemporary, National and European Perspectives, 21 W. EUR. POL. 53 (1998); Central
Bankers, EcONOmIST, Feb. 19, 2000, at 106.
46. See sources cited supra note 45.
47. NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17,1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289.
48. Treaty Establishing a Common Market, Mar. 26, 1991, Arg.-Braz.-Para.-Uru., 30
I.L.M. 1041.
49. Association of Southeast Asian Nations Declaration, Aug. 8, 1967, 6 I.L.M. 1223.
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accountable politicians in legislatures and executives to semi-
autonomous, relatively insulated, and seemingly apolitical policy-
making bodies.
III. LOOKING BACKWARDS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL
EMPOWERMENT THROUGH CONSTITUTIONALIZATION
The expansion ofjudicial power through constitutionalization, the
increasing intrusion of the judiciary into the prerogatives of
legislatures and executives, and the corresponding acceleration of
the judicialization of politics in so many countries over the past few
decades may shed light on an often ignored aspect of the judicial
review versus democracy debate-the political origins of
constitutionalization. Because both the constitutionalization of
rights and judicial review limit the institutional flexibility of
political decision-makers, the increasingly common phenomenon of
judicial empowerment through these reforms seems, prima facie, to
run counter to the interests of power-holders in legislatures and
executives. How, then, can we explain the voluntary transfer of
power from majoritarian policymaking arenas to national high
courts through constitutionalization? °
I would argue that the constitutionalization of rights and the
establishment of judicial review in Canada, Israel, New Zealand,
and South Africa (to mention only four countries in which a major
constitutional reform has taken place in the past few years), could
not have developed and cannot be understood in isolation from the
major political and cultural struggles that structure the political
systems of these countries. A close analysis of the political origins
of the recent constitutional revolutions in these countries suggests
that politicians representing social and economic elites, in coopera-
tion with the judicial elite, determined the timing, extent, and
nature of constitutional reform in these countries. Political actors
representing hegemonic social, political, and economic forces usually
attempt to shape the legal system to suit their interests. To do so
effectively in rule-of-law polities, they must secure the cooperation
of the judicial elite with whom the political elite often have close
social ties. The changes that emerge reflect a combination of
political and economic preferences and professional interests. To be
50. For a critical survey of extant theories of constitutional transformation and their
drawbacks, see Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through
Constitutionalization, supra note 44.
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sure, demands for constitutional change often emanate from various
groups within the body politic, but if hegemonic political and
professional elites and their parliamentary representatives do not
foresee gain from a proposed change, the change is likely to be
blocked.
Political institutions produce differential distributive effects: they
privilege some groups and individuals over others. Prominent
political actors are therefore likely to favor the establishment of
institutions that will benefit them the most.5 Although constitu-
tions and judicial review hold no independent pursestrings, they
nonetheless limit the institutional flexibility of political decision-
makers. Thus, the voluntary transfer of policymaking authority to
the courts through constitutionalization seems, prima facie, to run
counter to the interests of power-holders in legislatures and
executives. Because judicial empowerment through constitution-
alization places limits on legislative power, the most plausible
explanation for such voluntary, self-imposed reforms is that political
power-holders who either initiate or refrain from blocking them
estimate that it serves their interests to abide by the limits imposed
by the new constitutional arrangements, and that the implementa-
tion of the constitutionalization of rights and judicial review are
likely to enhance their relative power vis-A-vis other elements in the
political system. In other words, the political actors who voluntarily
establish self-enforcing institutions such as constitutions and
judicial review must assume that their costs under the new
institutional structure will be compensated by the limits it might
impose on rival political elements.52
51. See generally JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT (1992); Terry Moe,
Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 213 (1990).
52. My argument here finds striking parallels in works concerning the political origins
of empowerment of other, similar semi-autonomous institutions such as central banks,
environmental regulatory bodies, and supranational tribunals. For example, in her study of
the political origins of the variance in the degree of central bank authority among developing
countries, Sylvia Maxfield argues that the interests and capacities of early central banking
institutions in such countries are shaped by the changing financial interests of those in a
position to voluntarily delegate authority to central banks: government politicians and private
banks. See Sylvia Maxfield, Financial Incentives and Central Bank Authority in
Industrializing Nations, 46 WORLD POL. 556 (1994). Drawing upon a similar logic, Michael
T. Maloney and Robert E. McCormick suggest that the variance in the level of support by
existing firms towards proposed environmental regulatory policies can be explained by the
different limits and costs such policies impose upon new firms. See Michael T. Maloney &
Robert E. McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation, 25 J.L. &
ECON. 99 (1982). Because environmental regulation typically imposes more stringent controls
on new firms, it restricts entry and potentially enhances the competitive position of existing
firms. Another example is the "intergovermnentalist" thesis which suggests that member
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As I have shown elsewhere, a detailed account of the political
origins of the constitutional revolutions in Canada (1982), New
Zealand (1990), Israel (1992), and South Africa (1993), for example,
suggests that judicial empowerment through constitutionalization
is, more often than not, the result of a conscious strategy under-
taken by threatened elites, seeking to preserve their hegemony vis-
A-vis a growing influence of "peripheral" groups and interests in
majoritarian policymaking arenas. When their hegemony is
increasingly challenged in such arenas, elites who possess dispro-
portionate access to, and influence over, the legal arena may initiate
a constitutional entrenchment of rights in order to transfer power
to supreme courts. There, based primarily on the courts' record of
adjudication and on the justices' ideological preferences, these elites
can safely assume that their policy preferences will be less con-
tested. In other words, increasing judicial intrusion into the
prerogatives of the legislature and the executive may provide an
efficient institutional solution for influential groups who seek to
preserve their hegemony, and who, threatened by an erosion of their
popular support, may find strategic drawbacks in continuing to
adhere to majoritarian decision-making processes.
This type of hegemonic preservation through the
constitutionalization of rights or an interest-based judicial empower-
ment is likely to occur (1) when the judiciary's public reputation for
states are the central institution builders of the European Community ("EC"), and that they
provide autonomy to the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") to serve their own purposes.
According to this approach member-states choose to create (and selectively abide by the limits
imposed by) supranational institutions because these institutions help them surmount
problems raised by the need for collective action and overcome domestic political problems.
The political power version of this thesis suggests that national governments from the
European Union ("EU") member-states have not been passive and unwilling victims of
European legal integration; they consciously transferred power to the court, and where the
ECJ has been proactive, the member governments have supported this. See, e.g., Geoffrey
Garrett et al., The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration
in the European Union, 52 INT'L ORG. 149 (1998); Geoffrey Garrett, International Cooperation
and Institutional Choice: The European Community's Internal Market, 46 INT'L ORG. 533
(1992). In a similar spirit, the party-based electoral market thesis understands judicial
empowerment in a given polity as derivative of the level of competitiveness of the electoral
market in that polity. When a ruling party expects to consistently win elections, the likelihood
of increased judicial empowerment is low. Only when a ruling party has low expectations of
remaining in power might it support judicial empowerment to ensure that the next ruling
party cannot use the judiciary to achieve its policy goals. See, e.g., Mark Ramseyer, The
Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721 (1994);
see also William Landes & Richard Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 18 J.L. ECON. 875 (1975). For a critical survey of the electoral market thesis see
Hirsch, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through Constitutionalization, supra
note 44.
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professionalism, political impartiality, and rectitude is relatively
high; (2) when judicial appointments are controlled to a large extent
by hegemonic political elites; and (3) when the courts' constitutional
jurisprudence predictably mirrors the cultural propensities and
policy preferences of the hegemonic elites. Under such conditions,
judicial empowerment through the constitutional fortification of
rights may provide an efficient institutional means for political
elites to insulate their increasingly challenged policy preferences
from popular political pressure, especially when majoritarian
decision-making processes are not operating to their advantage.53
The widespread transition to democracy, the growth of popular
demands for political representation, the ultimate triumph of
universal suffrage (including breaking the historical dependence of
voting rights upon property ownership, gender, or ethnic origin), the
global decline in formalized instances of racial and gender segrega-
tion, the unprecedented scope of immigration to many Western
countries over the past three decades that threatens to change the
"demographic balance" in these countries thus increasing demands
by local communities for greater self-government, and the growing
dependence of politicians upon the idiosyncratic whims of their
constituencies, as well as the growing presence of "peripheral"
interests and policy preferences (for example, environmentalism,
disarmament, multiculturalism, non-mainstream sexual prefer-
ences, regional and religious separatism) in crucial majoritarian
policy-making arenas-all these recent phenomena imply a growing
potential threat to established interests. The growing representation
of "peripheral" interests in majoritarian policymaking fora over the
past few decades further emphasizes the tension on the state
53. Judicial empowerment through the constitutionalization ofrights may also serve the
interests of influential coalitions of domestic economic elites (for example, powerful
industrialists and conglomerates given added impetus by global economic trends). Such elites
may view the constitutionalization of rights, especially property, mobility, and occupational
rights, as a means of promoting economic deregulation, and of fighting what its members
often perceive to be harmful"large government" policies of an encroaching state. The transfer
of power to the courts may also serve the interests of a supreme court seeking to enhance its
political influence and international profile. As the sources cited supra note 20 illustrate,
national high courts may primarily promote legal policy, but they are also strategic actors,
who may realize when the changing preferences of other influential political actors, as well
as changes in the institutional context might allow them to strengthen their own institutional
position by expanding their involvement in crucial policymaking arenas. See KNIGHT, supra
note 51, at 10-11. Moreover, the constitutionalization of rights and the establishment of
judicial review may support the interests of a supreme court seeking to increase its symbolic
power, by fostering its alignment with a growing community of liberal democratic nations
engaged in rights-based discourse.
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between powerful centripetal forces of convergence (for example,
formal democracy, global capitalism, economic neoliberalism, and
converging media consumption) acting from outside, and re-
emerging centrifugal forces of divergence (for example, regionalism,
differentiated citizenship, and growing economic inequality) acting
on the state from the inside. In the face of such potential challenges,
threatened but still dominant elites may choose to limit the
policymaking authority of majoritarian decision-making fora by
gradually transferring authority from such fora to semiautonomous,
relatively insulated, professional and seemingly impartial policy-
making institutions such as national high courts, central banks,
transnational trade organizations and supranational tribunals.
By keeping popular decision-making mechanisms at the forefront
of the formal democratic political process, and simultaneously
removing more and more policymaking authority from majoritarian
policymaking arenas to semiautonomous, insulated, professional
policymaking bodies, those who possess disproportionate access to,
and have a decisive influence upon such bodies may minimize the
potential threat to their hegemony. I would therefore speculate that
the current global trend toward judicial empowerment through
constitutionalization is part and parcel of a broader process,
whereby hegemonic but threatened political, economic, and cultural
elites increasingly choose to tie their hands in order to insulate
policymaking from the vicissitudes of democratic politics. The
combination of formal popular decision-making mechanisms and
substantially insulated policymaking bodies controlled to a large
extent by hegemonic interests is perhaps the least dangerous modus
vivendi for the established oligarchies of wealth, power, and cultural
hegemony given the growing presence of "peripheral" interests in
majoritarian policymaking arenas.
IV. LOOKING FORWARDS: STRATEGIES FOR MITIGATING THE
COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY
Taking the Constitution away from the courts by establishing
what Mark Tushnet calls "populist constitutionalism" might indeed
overcome the tension between constitutionalism and judicial review
on the one hand, and fundamental democratic principles of political
participation and self-government on the other.54 However, some-
54. See TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 177-94.
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what less-utopian and abstract strategies for mitigating the counter-
majoritarian nature ofjudicial review have already been at work in
established democracies that have undergone judicial empowerment
through constitutionalization over the past few decades. I would
argue that we should look to these other examples and move to a
comparative view of constitutionalism in order to illuminate the
various aspects of the tension between judicial review and democ-
racy; a study that concentrates solely on the singular American
constitutional legacy is necessarily going to produce idiosyncratic
conclusions, not readily transferable to other political and legal
contexts.
Precisely because many recent constitutional revolutions have
taken place in established democracies, the framers of the new
constitutional arrangements in these countries could not ignore the
counter-majoritarian tendency embedded in constitutionalism and
judicial review. Persisting political traditions of public deliberation
and parliamentary sovereignty had to be taken into account by those
who initiated the constitutionalization of rights and judicial review
in Britain, Canada, France, Israel, and New Zealand (to mention
only a few examples). The result has been the development of a
variety of innovative institutional mechanisms aimed at compensat-
ing for the counter-majoritarian difficulty embedded in judicial
review. Consider the following brief examples.
The rights protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms,55 for example, are subject to three important limitations.
First, the Charter applies only to the actions of the government.56 It
is intended to protect individuals from abuses of state power and is
not meant to regulate behavior between private individuals. 7
Second, section 1 of the Charter (the "Limitation Clause") states
that the rights protected by the Charter are guaranteed, subject to
"such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society."" In other words, if any
limits are to be put on rights, then the government must establish
to the satisfaction of the courts that those limits can be justified in
55. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms).
56. See id. § 32.
57. See id.
58. Id. § 1.
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a free and democratic society.59 Third, a significant limitation to
rights and freedoms lies in section 33-the "Notwithstanding
Clause."60 This clause enables elected politicians, in either the
federal parliament or the provincial legislatures, to legally limit
rights and freedoms under section 2 (fundamental freedoms) and
sections 7 to 15 (due process and equality rights) of the Charter, by
passing overriding legislation valid for a period of up to five years.6'
This means that any invocation of section 33 essentially grants
parliamentary fiat over these rights and freedoms. This, in turn,
means that, at least in theory, both the federal Parliament (with
regard to federal matters) and the provincial legislatures (with
regard to matters within provincial jurisdictions) are ultimately
sovereign over these affairs. True, since the Charter's enactment in
1982, there have been only five instances (and only two outside
Qu6bec) where provincial governments have either invoked or
attempted to invoke the Notwithstanding Clause. However, in light
of the accelerated judicialization of politics in Canada and the
increasing political prominence of the Canadian Supreme Court,
prominent political critics have urged the use of the Charter's
section 33 to override recent controversial court decisions dealing
with equality rights in the context of sexual preference, and with the
constitutionality of future unilateral secession by Qu6bec.62
59. In the landmark judgment of The Queen v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, the Supreme
Court of Canada developed a two-pronged approach to interpreting the Charter's Limitation
Clause. See id. at 138-39. The first inquiry is whether the challenged law or conduct violates,
denies, or infringes any right. See id. at 138. This requires an analysis of the scope and
definition of the right, as well as the purpose and effect of the legislation and conduct. See id.
The second inquiry is whether there has been a justifiable limitation on the right concerned.
See id. at 139. A similar "Limitation Clause" is part of South Africa's new constitutional
catalogue of rights adopted in 1996. See S. AFR. CONST. (1996) ch. II, § 36(1).
60. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms) § 33(1).
61. See id. § 33(1)-(3).
62. For a list of such calls, see, for example, F.L. MORTON & RANIER KNOPFF, THE
CHARTER REVOLUTION AND THE COURT PARTY (2000). Three recent judgments of the Supreme
Court of Canada triggered the bulk of these calls (and therefore the political revival of section
33 over the past two years). See M. v. H, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 3 (stating that section 15(1) of the
Charter also entitles same-sex couples to sue for spousal support on the same basis as
common-law heterosexual couples); Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217
(holding that unilateral secession would be an unconstitutional act under both domestic and
international law; that a majority vote in Quebec is not sufficient to allow the French-
speaking province to legally separate from the rest of Canada; and that if and when secession
is approved by a clear majority of the people of Qu6bec voting in a referendum on a clear
question, the sides must negotiate in good faith on the terms of the breakup); Vriend v.
Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (holding that Alberta's Individual Rights Protection Act
contravened the Charter's section 15(1) equality rights because it failed to include sexual
orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination; and ordering that the words "sexual
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Like the Canadian Charter, Israel's new Basic Laws protecting
fundamental rights and liberties contain a limitation clause
forbidding infringement of the declared rights, except by legislation
that is deemed to be in accordance with the values of the State of
Israel, and intended for an appropriate purpose, and even then the
infringement is permitted only to the extent necessary." Moreover,
in 1994, two years after its enactment, Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation was amended by the Knesset (the Israeli parliament) in
the spirit of the Canadian "notwithstanding" override clause to
allow for future modifications by ordinary laws in the instance of an
absolute majority of Knesset members declaring support for the
amendment.'
Unlike the Canadian Charter and other constitutional catalogues
of rights adopted over the past few decades, the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act ("NZBOR") of 1990 is an ordinary statute that does not
formally empower the courts to nullify legislation inconsistent with
its provisions.65 Nevertheless, the operational provisions of the Bill
were designed to reduce the likelihood of legislation unreasonably
infringing upon the rights protected by the NZBOR, and in practice
set the basis for an active judicial review system in New Zealand.
Section 5 of the Bill provides that "the rights and freedoms con-
tained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society."66 Section 6 of the Bill requires courts to
interpret laws in a manner consistent with the Act.6" There are clear
signs that the New Zealand Court of Appeal may accord the NZBOR
a de facto entrenched status.6" In addition, section 7 of the NZBOR
orientation" be read into the Act, effectively expanding its scope to cover lesbians and gay
men).
63. See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, § 8; Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation, 1992, § 4. Significantly, both laws authorize judicial review. However, article 10
of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty grants immunity from scrutiny to all previously
existing legislation. Thus, the supremacy of this Basic Law is only as regards future
legislation that may infringe on rights guaranteed by the Basic Law.
64. See Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 1994, S.H. 90 § 8.
65. See New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990.
66. Id. § 5.
67. See id. § 6.
68. In a landmark decision in 1994, for example, the Court observed that lack of
entrenchment and constitutional status "makes no difference to the strength of the Bill of
Rights where it is to be applied." Simpson v. Attorney General, [1994] 3 N.Z.L.R. 667, 706.
This and other recent decisions of the Court of Appeal indicate that the Bill of Rights, though
unentrenched, may gradually gain sufficient legal and political authority to allow the courts
to practically exercise most of the powers of scrutiny and control they would have had under
a system of full-scale judicial review.
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requires the Attorney General to advise the House of Representa-
tives whenever he or she believes that any provision in a bill
introduced to Parliament would infringe upon a right.69 This
procedure has been invoked several times since 1990, generally
having the effect of preventing the provision from being enacted.7"
Taken together, these provisions established a new model ofjudicial
review in New Zealand that I call the preferential model. This
compromise model ofjudicial review that has been established over
the past decade in several common-law countries with a long
tradition of parliamentary supremacy, such as Britain, gives
preference to legislation or a court judgment that is consistent with
the Bill of Rights over one that is not, and instructs legislators to
avoid enacting laws that contradict, prima facie, constitutional
provisions protecting basic rights. This model enables a limited
judicial review on the one hand, and accords with the parliamentary
tradition in these countries on the other.
The British Human Rights Act, 1998,71 which will become effective
in October 2000, presents another version of the "preferential"
model. The Act, which is based, inter alia, on New Zealand's
experience with non-entrenched bill of rights, will require the courts
to interpret existing and future legislation as much as possible in
accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights. 2
According to the Act, if the higher courts in Britain decide that an
Act of Parliament prevents someone from exercising his or her
human rights, judges will make what is termed a "declaration of
incompatibility."73 Such a declaration would then put ministers, so
it is hoped, under political pressure to change the law. Formally, the
European Convention will not override existing Acts of Parliament,
but ministers will have to state whether each new piece of legisla-
tion they introduce complies with the European Convention on
Human Rights.74
The Conseil Constitutionnel, which was established by the 1958
constitution of France's Fifth Republic,75 has limited preenactment
69. See New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, § 7, 1990.
70. See, e.g., Paul Rishworth, Civil Liberty and Democracy, in NEW ZEALAND POLITICS IN
TRANSITION (1998).
71. Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42 (Eng.).
72. See id. § 2.
73. Id. § 4.
74. See id.
75. See FR. CONST. (1958), tit. VII.
JUDICIAL REVIEW VS. DEMOCRACY
constitutional review powers.76 The principal power of the Council
has been to control the constitutionality of legislative bills passed by
Parliament but not yet promulgated by the President of the
Republic.77 In addition, the council (1) ensures the regularity of
presidential elections;78 (2) rules on disputes in parliamentary
elections;79 and (3) rules on the constitutionality of laws before they
are promulgated if requested by the president, the premier, the
president of the houses of the legislature, or, since an amendment
in 1974, sixty members of either house.80 Unlike the courts in the
United States, Canada, and Germany for example, the council has
no power to nullify a law after it is enacted by the legislature.'
Numerous other mechanisms such as (1) relatively flexible
constitutional amendment procedures; (2) national commissions of
inquiry (for example, the Truth and Reconciliation Committee in
South Africa or the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples in
Canada) whose deliberations are open to the public; (3) constituent
assemblies, referenda, and plebiscites concerning constitutional
reform; (4) greater emphasis on state-level constitutionalism; (5)
innovative judicial appointment processes; (6) broad standing and
intervenor rights; and (7) generous legal aid programs targeted at
historically disenfranchised groups, have been introduced by several
established democracies over the past few decades. All of these new
mechanisms (as well as other, less-formal strategies such as close
monitoring of the judiciary by the media, frequent and widely
publicized public opinion polls measuring levels of concrete and
diffuse popular support of national high courts, and the increasingly
popular constitutional dialogue between national high courts and
76. See, e.g., ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE CoNsTrru-
TIONAL COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1992); Doris M. Provine, Courts in the
Political Process in France, in COURTS, LAw AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
(1996).
77. See FR. CONST. (1958), tit. VII, art. 61.
78. See id. art. 58.
79. See id. art. 59.
80. See id. art. 61.
81. Preventative control ofthe constitutionality ofnonpromulgated legislation is exercised
by the Conseil Constitutionnel in two ways: (1) Obligatory control of "organic" laws and
parliamentary regulations- all "organic" laws and the rules of procedure of the Assembly and
the Senate must be submitted to the Conseil Constitutionnel before they are promulgated to
enable the Conseil to rule on constitutionality; and (2) Facultative control of the
constitutionality ofordinary laws and of international treaties-the President of the Republic,
or the Prime Minister, or the President of either house of Parliament, or 60 members of either
house of Parliament may submit a law before it to the Conseil Constitutionnel. See id. When
requested, the Council must also decide whether an international treaty contains clauses that
are contrary to the constitution. See id. art. 54.
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legislatures) can be viewed as innovative strategies for mitigating
the counter-majoritarian difficulty embedded in judicial review and
enhancing the constitutional dialogue between elected politicians
and the courts, thereby reducing the apparent tension between
judicial review and principles of democratic governance.
Despite this spate of constitutional innovation, the bulk of
American critical constitutional studies continues to conceptualize
the counter-majoritarian difficulty in oversimplified and dichoto-
mous, "either/or" type terms, portraying the gap between rigid
constitutions and political participation as irreconcilable and
insurmountable. I would suggest, however, that a better acquain-
tance with at least some of the strategies introduced by the "new
constitutionalism" for minimizing the effects of the counter-
majoritarian difficulty would enrich the ongoing scholarly debate
between mainstream and critical American constitutionalists
concerning various normative and empirical merits and drawbacks
of American constitutionalism.
V. CONCLUSION
In his recently published review of Akhil Reed Amar's The Bill of
Rights: Creation and Reconstruction,"2 Mark Graber convincingly
argues that Amar's work is professionally disturbing as it illustrates
the lack of interest that prominent legal scholars display in what
political scientists have to say about American constitutionalism."
Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts is a direct reply to
Graber's justified concern. In contrast to Amar's book, it is fall of
fascinating insights and observations from history, philosophy, and
political science that support Tushnet's thought-provoking argu-
ments.
That said, I believe that most American constitutional law
scholarship would benefit from taking another step in a "universal-
ist" or "cosmopolitan" direction. After all, what Tushnet views as a
necessary and sufficient set of constitutional principles aimed
primarily at protecting formal equal treatment and individual
liberty (the "thin Constitution"), may seem to non-American
constitutionalists as merely secondary to fundamental constitutional
82. AKmiL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998).
83. See Mark Graber, The Constitution asa Whole:A Partial Political Science Perspective,
33 U. RICH. L. REV. 343, 344 (1999).
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principles concerning separation of powers, federalism, and
responsible government.
Mark Tushnet concludes one of the chapters of his book with the
following words:
[-Judicial review basically amounts to noise around zero: It offers
essentially random changes, sometimes good, sometimes bad, to what
the political system produces. On balance, judicial review may have
some effect in offsetting legislators' inattention to constitutional
values. The effect is not obviously good, which makes us lucky that it
is probably small anyway.'
Such a compelling "grand thesis" concerning one of the most
powerful ideas of our times ought to inform and be informed by
political and judicial contexts other than the United States's
exceptional, if not outright idiosyncratic, constitutional legacy.
84. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 153.
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